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LEGISLATOR JUDGES 
The Warren Court and Justices' Use of State or 
International Policies in Criminal Procedure Cases 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  
The Warren Court went to great lengths to expand criminal defendants' rights, and in doing so it frequently 
relied on state majoritarian institutions' policies or international norms to accomplish its goals. The Court 
and justices were almost twice as likely to use state laws than international policies in their reasoning 
The Court was also almost two-and-a-half times more likely to use state or international policies in 
its rationale when deciding in favor of the criminal defendant in relation to the state's interest. 
In Trap v. Dulles (1958), the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided that a native­
born American's citizenship could 
not be revoked by a court-martial 
under the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. To 
discern whether the court-martial 
was constitutional, the Court did 
not rely solely on the Constitution. 
Instead, the Court mused that, "The 
[Eighth] Amendment must draw its 
meaning from the evolving stan­
dards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society."1 
by JOHN R. HERMANN 
The Court used international laws 
to determine what the "evolving 
standards of decency" were: "The 
civilized nations of the world are 
in virtual unanimity that stateless­
ness is not to be imposed as punish­
ment for crime .... The United Nations' 
survey of the nationality laws of 84 
nations of the world reveals that only 
two countries, the Phillippines and 
Turkey, impose denationalization as 
a penalty for desertion.''2 
The Warren Court's use of state or 
international policies is not limited 
I would like to thank Alex Gallin-Parisi at 
Trinity University for her assistance on my initial 
literature review. David Crockett at Trinity 
University also deserves special gratitude for 
reading a rough draft of this manuscript. Chris 
Nicholson at University of Houston made invalu­
able suggestions as the discussant of my panel 
at the 2013 Southern Political Science Associa· 
tion. Finally, I am indebted to Rorie Spill Solberg 
(Editor) and the anonymous reviewers for their 
comments on this research project. 
1. 356 U.S. 86. 101 (1958). While the Trop Court 
enunciated the words .. evolving standards of 
decency," the Warren Court is just paraphras­
ing the Court in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 
349 (1910), embracing the notion of a living 
Constitution. 
2. Id. at l 02· l 03. 
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to its Eighth Amendment juris­
prudence.3 The Warren Court also 
considered state or international 
policies in some of its most impor­
tant criminal procedure cases. In 
Mapp v. Ohio (1961),4 for example, 
the Supreme Court overturned Wolf 
v. Colorado (1949).5 Both cases dealt 
with the Fourth Amendment's exclu­
sionary rule, which holds that evi­
dence obtained illegally by the police 
is inadmissible in a court of law. In 
overturning the Wolf decision that 
the exclusionary rule does not apply 
to the states, the Mapp Court rea­
soned that "while in 1949, prior to 
the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of 
the States were opposed to the use 
of the exclusionary rule, now, despite 
Lhe Wolf case, more than half of those 
since passing upon it, by their own 
legislative or judicial decision, have 
whole or partly adopted or adhered 
to the Weeks [exclusionary] rule."6 
Additionally, in Miranda v. Arizona 
(1966),7 the Court mandated that 
police notify suspects of their Fifth 
Amendment right from self-incrim­
ination and Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel. A key part of the Court's 
reasoning in Miranda involved exam­
ining foreign countries' policies 
on the issue. In addition to explor­
ing English common law, the Court 
found that "Scottish judicial deci­
sions bar use in evidence of most 
confessions obtained through police 
interrogation."8 The Court continued 
by stating that "in India [and Ceylon], 
confessions made to police not in the 
presence of a magistrate have been 
excluded."9 
Clearly, the Warren Court relied 
on state or international laws in its 
decision making in these high-profile 
criminal procedure cases. Yet, the 
extent to which these same justices 
imported state or international stan­
dards into federal law in their path­
breaking criminal jurisprudence 
remains unclear. This study seeks 
to answer two questions: First, how 
frequently did the Warren Court and 
justices rely on state or international 
laws when making decisions? And, 
second, was the Warren Court more 
likely to use state or international 
laws when ruling in favor of the indi-
vidual over state interests? 
The answers to these two ques­
tions are important because, while 
it is well chronicled that the Warren 
Court sided with the individual over 
the government in criminal proce­
dure cases, little is known about 
how the Court justified its decisions. 
If the Court and individual justices 
were using state or even interna­
tional laws, did they use them to 
gain support from the majoritarian 
branches of government, indicating 
the judiciary's inherent weakness 
in the American political system? 
Equally important, did the Court and 
justices use state or international 
laws in their reasoning based on the 
attitudinal or legal models of deci­
sion making? If so, then the Court 
and justices' use of state or inter­
national laws are simply post hoc 
reasoning and thus symbolic. The 
Court and justices may have needed 
to legitimize their preferred policy 
positions by citing state and interna­
tional policies. 
legislator Judges and Their legacy 
Understanding the Warren Court 
and justices' use of state or interna­
tional policies in their decisions is 
important for several reasons. First, 
the counter-majoritarian role that 
the Supreme Court can play in the 
American political system is one of 
the most prominent debates attract­
ing Supreme Court scholars.1° In The 
Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander 
Bickel explains "the root difficulty 
is that judicial review is a counter-
3. It is important to note that I am not imply­
ing that the Court Is using the "evolving of stan· 
<lards of decency" doctrine here. This doctrine 
did not formally become precedent until Gregg 
v. Georgia, 428 U.S. L53 (1976). The "evolving 
standards of decency" doctrine, moreover, only 
applies to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. 
4. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
5. 338 U.S. 25 (1949). 
6. 367 U.S. 643, 65 l (1961). 
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
8. Id. at 488. 
9. Id. at 488-489. 
10. Dahl. Decision Moking in a Democracy, 16 
). Pua. L. 287 (1957): ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Jonathan D. 
Casper. The Supreme Court & Notional Policy 
Making, 70 A.P.S.R. 50 (1976); john B. Gates, Par­
tisan Realignment, Unconstitutionol State Policy, 
and the United States Supreme Court, 31 A.J.P.S. 
259 (1987). 
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majoritarian force in our system .... 
[W ]hen the Supreme Court declares 
unconstitutional a legislative act or 
the action of an elected executive, 
it thwarts the will of the represen­
tatives of the actual people of here 
and now; it exercises control, not in 
behalf of the prevailing majority, but 
against it."11 If the Warren Court and 
justices considered state or inter­
national policies in their criminal 
procedure decisions, they may have 
reaffirmed the majority's wishes. 
Several scholars have raised con­
cerns that the justices of the Warren 
Court assumed policy-making 
powers that belong to the legisla­
ture and states, violating separation 
of powers and federalism, respec­
tively.12 Bernard Schwartz, for 
example, muses that "the Warren 
Court had to perform a transform­
ing role, usually thought of as more 
appropriate to the legislator than 
the judge."13 These same justices 
have also been accused of setting an 
independent moral agenda.14 Again, 
if the Warren Court used a version 
of a majoritarian process (i.e., con­
sidering state/international laws) 
in a counter-majoritarian fashion 
(i.e., judicial review), it may have 
been affirming many of the electoral 
branch policies even when striking 
down laws as unconstitutional. 
In addition, the Warren Court's 
criminal procedure decisions are 
worthy of analysis because they left 
an indelible imprint on virtually 
every citizen's rights. The Warren 
Court transformed the criminal 
justice system by favoring criminal 
11. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER· 
ous BRANCH 16-17 (1962); but sec, for example , 
Michael ). Klarman, Rethinking The C1v1/ Rights 
Ancl Civil Liberties Revolution, 82 VA. L. Rev. I 
(1996); Barry Friedman. The Birth of An Academic 
Obsession: The Nistory of the Countermajorltorian 
Difficulty, Part Five. 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
12. BEllNAR 0 SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF Tim 
SUPREME COURT (1993); William J. St UlltZ, The 
Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure 
and Criminal justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997). 
13. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF TllE 
SUPREME COURT 263 (1993). 
14. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGER· 
OUS BRANCll (1962); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOC· 
RACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA (1987); but see Corinna Barrett Lain, 
Countermojoritorion Nero or Zero: Rethinking the 
Warren Courts Role in the Criminal Procedure 
Revol11cfo11. 152 u. PA. L. REV. 1361 (2004). 
defendants' rights over the state's 
interests in fighting crime. Bernard 
Schwartz notes that the "[p]rotec­
tion of the rights of criminal defen­
dants had become a primary concern 
of the Warren Court."15 Moreover, 
the Warren Court ensured that 
several criminal procedure clauses 
in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth 
Amendments that applied to the 
federal government also applied 
to the states. Some of the criminal 
procedure issues that were selec­
tively applied to the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause during the Warren Court 
were: the Fourth Amendment's 
exclusionary rule in Mapp v. Ohio 
(1961),16 the Sixth Amendment's 
right to counsel in Gideon v. Wain­
wright (1963).'7 the Fifth Amend­
ment's right from self-incrimination 
in Malloy v. Hogan (1964),18 the Sixth 
Amendment's right to confront a 
witness in Pointer v. Texas (1965), 19 
the Fifth Amendment's right from 
self-incrimination, the Sixth Amend­
ment's right to counsel in Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966),20 the Sixth Amend­
ment's right to a speedy trial in 
Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967),21 the 
Sixth Amendment's right to a jury 
trial in Duncan v. Louisiana (1968),22 
and the Fifth Amendment's double 
jeopardy clause in Benton v. Maryland 
(1969).23 
Finally, in Trap the Court appeared 
to start a controversy over the role 
of using state and international laws 
15. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE 
SUPREME COURT 281 (1993). 
16. 367 U.S. 643. 
17. 372 U.S. 355. 
18. 378 U.S. l. 
19. 380 U.S. 400. 
20. 384 U.S. 436. 
21. 386 U.S. 213. 
22. 391 U.S. 145 . 
23. 395 U.S. 784. 
24. 543 U.S. 551. at 568. 
25. Id. at 576. 
26. Id. at 624. 
27. William W. Berry, Following the Yellow Brick 
Road of Evolvi11g Standards of Decency: The l1·onic 
Consequences of "Death·ls·Different jurisprudence. 
28 PACE L. REV. 15 (2007); Tonja Jacobi, The Subtle 
Unraveling of Federalism: The Illogic of Using State 
l.egislation as Evidence of an Evolving National 
Consensus, 84 N. CAR. L. REV. 1089 (2006); Michael 
S. Moore, Morality in Eighth Amendmentjurispru· 
dence. 31 HARV. j. Pua. L. & POL'Y 47 (2008); Tom 
Stacy. Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess. 
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS J. 475 (2005); THOMAS 
� 
in criminal procedure cases. Almost � � SO years later in Roper v. Simmons � 
(2005), for example, the majority � 
held that the death penalty could .£ 
not be applied to juveniles under 
the Eighth Amendment. The Court 
held that a "majority of States have 
rejected the imposition of the death 
penalty on juvenile offenders under 
18, and we now hold this is required 
by the Eighth Amendment."24 In 
terms of international law, the Court 
reasoned that "every country has 
ratified save the United States and 
Somalia ... an express prohibition 
on capital punishment for crimes 
committed by juveniles under 18."25 
Some justices do not agree that inter­
national laws should be included 
as part of the Court's reasoning. In 
dissent in Roper, Associate Justice 
Antonin Scalia joined by Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist and Associ-
ate justice Clarence Thomas harshly 
criticize the majority's decision by 
stating that "more fundamentally, 
however, the basic premise of the 
Court's argument-that American 
law should conform to the laws of 
the rest of the world-ought to be 
rejected out of hand."26 
What We Already Know 
Most of the literature involving the 
Court's use of state or international 
laws has focused on Eighth Amend­
ment jurisprudence.27 Additionally, 
legal scholars have devoted more 
attention to the Court's use of state 
WALKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECUTION: THE STORY OF 
THE DARYL ATKINS CASE (2009); but see Corinna 
Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving 
Standards," 57 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2009). 
28. THOMAS W1\LKER, ELIGIBLE FOR EXECU· 
TION: THE STORY OF THE DARYL ATKINS CASE 
(2009). 
29. Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and 
the Democratic Practice of judicial Review, 14 
NYU Rr::v. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679 (1986); Corinna 
Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "Evolving 
Standards," 57 UCLA L. REV. 365 (2009); Sheldon 
Bernard Lyke. Lawrence as an Eighth Amend­
ment Cose: Sodomy and the Evolving Standards 
of Decency, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 633 
(2009). 
30. Steven L. W inter, Tennessee v. Corner and 
the Democratic Practice of judicial Review, 14 
NYU REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 683-692 (1986). 
31. Id. at 692. 
32. Sheldon Bernard Lyke, Lawrence as an 
Eig/1th Amendment Case: Sodomy and the Evolving 
StandardsofDecency, 15 WM. & MARY j. WOMEN & 
L. 633. 635 (2009). 
l:l 
o r  international policies in its rea­
soning than political scientists.28 
There is a growing body of literature 
that is interested in how the Court 
applies state or international laws in 
other clauses of the Constitution in 
addition to the Eighth Amendment.29 
Steven Winter, for example, notes 
that the Court used the norms and 
mores of the states, municipalities, 
and police departments in its reason­
ing of when it is appropriate for peace 
officers to use deadly force in Tennes­
see v. Garner (1985).30 Winter even 
suggests that the Court is a "popular 
oracle."31 Similarly, Sheldon Bernard 
Lyke contends that the Court used 
the "evolving standards of decency" 
doctrine in its sodomy decision in 
Lawrence v. Texas (2003). Lyke pro­
vides evidence that "Lawrence can 
be read as part of the Court's Eighth 
Amendment evolving standards of 
decency jurisprudence."32 
To date, Corina Barrett Lain has 
conducted the most comprehensive 
study of the Court's use of state laws 
in its reasoning in non-death penalty 
jurisprudence. Through rich descrip­
tion of individual cases, Lain demon­
strates that the Court has considered 
state policies in its reasoning in many 
cases involving the Bill of Rights 
(including selective incorporation) 
and the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 
Lain's central finding is that "the 
Supreme Court's explicitly majoritar­
ian approach to Eighth Amendment 
protection is not all that different 
from what the Court does in other 
constitutional contexts. From due 
WWW AJS ORG • JUDICATURE 237 
process to equal protection, from the 
First Amendment to the Fourth and 
Sixth, the Supreme Court routinely­
and explicitly-determines constitu­
tional protection based on whether 
a majoritarian of states agree with 
it."33 To explain the prevalence of the 
Court's use of state laws in its reason­
ing, she suggests "the Court's state 
polling exercises are not so differ­
ent from what the rest of us do when 
making difficult decisions: we look to 
others for guidance."34 Lain concludes 
that "the Supreme Court [is] living up 
to its legacy as the 'least dangerous 
branch.'"35 
While extant literature provides 
a theoretical and descriptive frame­
work for the Court's use of state or 
international laws in its reasoning, 
the issue has never been empirically 
tested. This study seeks to empiri­
cally examine this phenomenon in 
the context of the Warren Court's 
criminal procedure cases. 
Data and Methods 
I started with the Supreme Court 
Database (hosted by Washington Uni­
versity, St. Louis) to find the universe 
of cases involving criminal proce­
dure decided by the Supreme Court 
between Trap v. Dulles, Secretmy of 
State (1958), and the conclusion of 
the Warren Court. I began with the 
Trap decision because it was here that 
the Court openly accepted the use of 
a living Constitution in justifying its 
decision, providing for the possibility 
of citing state or international laws 
in future decisions. Since Trop dealt 
with a criminal issue, I focused the 
analysis on criminal procedure cases 
during this era. Cases were selected 
that involved a criminal procedure 
issue and a constitutional issue when 
the Court issued a full opinion. For 
inclusion in this study, the Court and 
justices must expressly state that the 
case involves a Fourth, Fifth (exclud­
ing the Takings Clause), Sixth, and/ 
or Eighth Amendment issue in the 
decision.36 The study included cases 
examining both federal and state 
laws.37 The total number of cases that 
met these criteria was 109. 
The 109 criminal court opinions 
were read to determine if the cases 
included a discussion of state or 
international laws in its reasoning, 
including majority, concurring, and 
dissenting opinions. The Court's deci­
sions that focused only on state or 
international laws of the distant past 
were excluded (e.g., colonial period, 
laws at the Constitutional Conven­
tion, or international policies during 
that era). Instead, the focus of this 
study is on justices' use of modern 
examples of or contemporaneous 
trends in state or international laws 
as part of their reasoning. At the state 
level, the analysis included city ordi­
nances, state laws, and police actions 
that were squarely part of the consti­
tutional issue. Excluded from analysis 
were state court decisions because 
the Supreme Court uses state court 
precedent frequently in its reasoning. 
At the international level, the study 
included decisions that analyzed 
international law as a part of the 
analysis, including court decisions. 
By examining any type of foreign law, 
the Warren Court and the individual 
justices were showing that they were 
interested in international norms and 
mores when crafting their decisions. 
Three examples where the jus­
tices use state or international laws 
in their reasoning will clarify my 
coding methodology. First, in Fer­
guson v. Georgia (1961),38 the Court 
considered the constitutionality of 
a state law in which a defense attor­
ney was prohibited from asking a 
defendant to testify at his own trial 
under the Sixth Amendment's right 
to counsel. In overturning the law, the 
Court held that "the State of Georgia 
is the only State-indeed, apparently 
the only jurisdiction in the common­
law world-to retain the common­
law rule that a person charged with 
a criminal offense is incompetent to 
testify under oath in his own behalf at 
his trial."39 The Court gave a myriad of 
examples of each state and the many 
nations that forbade this practice. 
Second, Associate justice Hugo 
Black's dissent in Abbate v. United 
States (1959)40 considered interna­
tional laws that involve the prohibi­
tion of the Fifth Amendment's double 
jeopardy clause. In his dissent, Black 
emphasized that "it has been recog-
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nized that most free countries have 
accepted a prior conviction else­
where as a bar to a second trial in 
their jurisdiction."41 Third, in Duncan 
v. Louisiana (1968),42 the Court con­
sidered state laws when determining 
whether the Sixth Amendment's right 
to a jury trial should be applied to the 
states via the Fourteenth Amend­
ment Due Process Clause. According 
to the Court, "indeed, there appear to 
be only two instances, aside from the 
Louisiana scheme, in which a State 
denies jury trial for a crime punish­
able by imprisonment for longer than 
six months.''43 
In terms of operationalizing the 
variables, I used the following coding 
scheme. If there is a presence of state 
or international law in the reason­
ing, the variable using state or inter­
national was coded 1; otherwise, the 
variable was coded 0. If the Court 
ruled in favor of the individual over 
the state, a variable was coded 1; oth­
erwise, it was 0. The justices were 
excluded from the analysis due to 
their presence in too small a number 
of cases. 
This study includes the Court and 
justices' discussion of state laws 
only, international laws only, and 
both.44 The study also examines how 
frequently the Court decided to rule 
in favor of the individual over the 
state's position. To discern whether 
33. Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionol· 
ism of"Evolving Standards,· 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 
369 (2009). 
34. Id. at 405. 
35. Id. at 406. 
36. Cases that involved only a Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause issue were 
excluded because some of the cases' definitions 
were nebulous in terms of defining the exact 
criminal procedure right in the Supreme Court 
database. 
37. I use the word "law" in this analysis to 
include both legislative and police action. The 
Warren Court used both legislative acts and 
police actions in its decisions. 
38. 365 U.S. 570. 
39. Id. at 570. 
40. 359 U.S. 187. 
41. Id. at 203. 
42. 391U.S.145. 
43. Id. at 162. 
44. This study recognizes that state and 
international laws are relatively different. This 
is why the study examines each individually. 
Nonetheless, both state and international laws 
serve similar purposes to the Court and indi· 
victual justices in their reasoning. They both use 
norms and mores or different governments­
whether at the state or international level. 
Frequency in Which the Warren Court and Individual Justices 
Use State or International Laws in Their Reasoning 
Cases, Court, and Justices 
All Cases (state or international policies), including 
majority, concurring, and dissenting dec1s1ons 
All Cases (state policies only), including ma1onty, 
concurring, and d1ssenltng decisions 
All Cases (international policies only), including 


















there was a relationship between the 
Warren Court using state or interna­
tional laws as part of its reasoning 
and ruling in favor of the individual, 
cross tabs and a one-tailed t-test was 
used. A t-test measures whether the 
means of two groups are statistically 
different from each other. It also dis­
cerns the likelihood the relationship 
between two variables occurred by 
chance. 
Results 
As evidenced in Table 1, the major­
ity, concurring, and/or dissenting 
opinions mentioned state or inter­
national policies almost a quarter 
(24%) of the time in the 109 criminal 
procedure cases decided between 
Trop v. Dulles and the conclusion 
45. ALEXANDER HAMILTON ET AL., THE FEDER· 
ALIST PAPERS 465-466 (1961). 
Number of Cases (total N) Percent 
26 (109) 24% 
21 (109) 19% 
11 (109) 10% 
20 (109) 18% 
7 (71) 10% 
12 (87) 14% 
15 (108) 14% 
l (5) 20% 
19 (108) 18% 
14 (72) 19% 
20 (109) 18% 
4 (22) 18% 
7 (47) 15% 
2 (25) 8% 
15 (109) 14% 
5 (28) 18% 
17 (104) 16% 
18 (107) 17% 
10 (81) 12% 
4 (23) 17% 
of the Warren Court. The justices 
were almost twice as likely to use 
state laws (19%) than international 
laws (10%) in their reasoning. The 
majority (18%) was more likely to 
use state and/or international poli­
cies in its reasoning in comparison to 
the concurring (10%) and dissenting 
opinions ( 14%). 
Equally interesting, Table 1 also 
reveals that every justice that served 
during the time period and included 
in this study was willing to use state 
or international policies in his rea­
soning. In their opinions, not one 
justice expressed any opposition 
to the Court's use of state or inter­
national laws in its reasoning. The 
justices' discussion of state or inter­
national policies ranged between 
a low of eight percent (Associate 
Justice Arthur Goldberg) to a high of 
20 percent (Associate Justice Harold 
Burton). With the exception of Asso­
ciate Justice Goldberg (8%). every 
justice used state or international 
policies in at least 12 percent of the 
cases he authored or joined. 
As Table 2 shows, the Court was 
almost two-and-a-half times more 
likely to use state or international 
laws to support its reasoning when 
they favored the individual over the 
state. The Court examined states or 
international policies in 17 of the 
76 (22%) cases where it supported 
the individual. In stark contrast, the 
Court only discussed state or inter­
national policies in three of the 33 
(9%) of the cases when it decided to 
side with the state's position. 
Based on the frequencies, it is 
reasonable to conclude that the 
Court and justices were more com­
fortable justifying their decisions 
with state laws than international 
laws, perhaps because state poli­
cies have to conform with the United 
States Constitution. The relation­
ship between the Court using state 
or international policies in its ratio­
nale and siding with the individual 
in criminal procedure cases was not 
likely to occur by chance. Using a 
one-tailed t-test, this study finds that 
there is only about an eight percent 
probability that this relationship 
took place because of chance. This 
finding is even more impressive 
given the low number of cases (109) 
under examination in this study. 
While these data do not reveal 
with precision the reason why the 
Court is more inclined to use state or 
international policies when ruling in 
favor of the individual over the state, 
it is plausible to speculate that this 
propensity is related to the Court's 
lack of enforcement powers. This 
proposition is echoed in Federalist 78 
when Alexander Hamilton states that 
the Court "may have truly be said to 
have neither FORCE nor WILL but 
merely judgment .... lt proves incon­
testably that the judiciary is beyond 
comparison the weakest of the three 
departments of power, that it can 
never attack with success either of 
the other two; and that all possible is 
requisite to enable it to defend itself 
against their attacks."45 Additionally, 
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it is likely that the justices strategi­
cally use state or international laws 
to justify their decisions in a post 
hoc way to aid in justifying their 
preferred policy preferences or in 
setting precedent. By using state or 
international policies when ruling 
in favor of the individual over the 
state interest, the Court frequently 
justifies its decisions to override the 
government by taking into consid­
eration the policies of other elected 
branches and the norms of the inter­
national community. 
Conclusion 
In the 109 criminal procedure cases 
decided between the Court's decision 
in Trop v. Dulles and the conclusion of 
the Warren Court, 24 percent of the 
majority, concurring, or dissenting 
opinions used state or international 
laws as part of their reasoning. Every 
justice used state or international 
policies in his reasoning at some 
point in the time period. The Court 
was almost two-and-a-half times 
more likely to use state or interna­
tional policies in its rationale when 
deciding in favor of the criminal 
defendant against the state's inter­
est. 
While the Warren Court went to 
great lengths to expand criminal 
defendants' rights based upon its 
conception of "the American scheme 
of justice,"46 it frequently relied on 
majoritarian institutions' policies or 
international norms to accomplish 
its goals. Such behavior indicates 
that the Warren Court was con­
cerned with support of its decisions 
from other branches of government. 
More importantly, we can conclude 
that the Warren Court's criminal pro­
cedure decisions may not be as coun­
ter-majoritarian as once thought. 
This finding is confirmed by Lain's 
(2004)47 case study of the Warren 
Court's criminal procedure deci­
sions in Mapp v. Ohio (1961),48 Gideon 
v. Wainwright (1963),49 Miranda v. 
Arizona (1966),so Katz v. United States 
(1967),51 and Terry v. Ohio (1968).52 
Lain concludes that "we see the Court 
as impervious to majoritarian pres­
sures when, in fact, nothing could be 
further from the truth.''53 My find-
Relationship Between the Maj ority Opinion Using State and/or 
International Policies & Ruling for the Individual Over the State 
Rules in Favor Rules in Favor 
Court of the State policy of the Individual Total 
Uses State/International Policies 
Does Not Use State/International Policies 
Total 
I-test: 0.08 (one-lailed) 
ings support Lain's conclusions-at 
least in terms of the Court justifying 
its decisions based on majoritarian 
policies. As Dahl said so long ago, the 
Court tends to follow the election 
returns. 54 
Gerald N. Rosenberg contends that 
courts do not have the ability to bring 
about independent social change 
without broad extra-legal forces sup­
porting its decisions.ss As evidenced 
by my findings, the Warren Court 
appears to justify some of its crimi­
nal procedure decisions by trends in 
state laws, supporting the idea that 
extra-legal forces were already in the 
works. 
Even though this study offers evi­
dence that the Warren Court's deci­
sions used state or international 
policies in their reasoning, we cannot 
assert with certainty that the Court's 
concern for majoritarian policies was 
the sole determinant of its reason­
ing. The justices likely relied on legal 
precedent and their own policy pref­
erences when reaching these deci­
sions. This study does demonstrate, 
however, that the justices clearly 
relied on state or international poli­
cies to justify a large swath of their 
criminal rights revolution. The Court 
recognized it needed another branch 
of government to enforce its position, 
and the use of state or international 
laws in its reasoning was a simple 
strategy to garner rnajoritarian deci­
sions. 
Given the limited scope of this 
study-the justices' use of state or 
international policies in the crimi­
nal procedure cases decided by the 
Warren Court-future research 
3 17 20 
30 59 89 
33 76 109 
should focus on whether the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and/or Roberts Courts 
engage in similar behavior. In addi­
tion to criminal procedure cases, 
future research also is needed in 
other issue areas. For example, do 
the Supreme Court and its justices 
also use state or international poli­
cies in First Amendment, Equal Pro­
tection Clause, and privacy doctrine 
cases? In other words, we need to 
investigate if the use of majoritar­
ian decisions is a common method of 
softening the rejection or invalida­
tion of a state or federal law. * 
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